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BY
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Summary
This paper discusses a model for analysing the sales of new products. This model accounts for
the fact that, even among those companies with permanent R&D activities, a fraction of the
firms did not have sales of innovative products over a two-year observation period. We propose
a model in which the fixed costs of introduction are a major concern in the decision-making pro-
cess. We apply a censored regression model, extended by a firm-specific threshold. We use a struc-
tural model to estimate the fixed costs of introducing new products to the market, and explain
subsequent sales of innovative products. We examine an indicator of innovative output, i.e. the
sales of products ‘new to the firm’. We estimate fixed cost thresholds by using data from the
Dutch section of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of 1998. R&D intensity, competition,
and market structure all have a positive impact on the sales of new products. The most important
factors that reduce the fixed cost threshold of introduction are product-related R&D investments,
R&D subsidies, and knowledge spillovers.
Key words: Innovation, product R&D, threshold model
JEL classification: C51, L23, O30
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper originated from the empirical observation that even among firms
that have R&D as a permanent activity, a fraction of firms did not have sales
of innovative products during a two-year observation period. The reason for
not introducing new products might be a lack of capabilities needed to intro-
duce new products, difficulties entering a market in which competitor inno-
vations are protected by strong propriety rights Teece (1986)) which there-
fore acts as a barrier to entering a market with new or improved products,
or firms might even wait and see whether a major change in product-market
combination is actually accepted before introducing their own new products.
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Waiting is often a sensible approach because firms that introduce innovations
that do not meet with success spend a considerable amount of time and incur
financial costs while commercializing the innovations, and may also damage
their reputation among users.
An extension to the latter argument could be that not all firms are faced
with the same intensity of product market competition (lack of necessity) or
that firms have different strategies to respond to competition, for instance, by
slightly modifying their existing product portfolio (i.e. incremental innovation)
in order to keep up with the competition instead of developing new products.
The latter might involve higher costs and economic risk, or the cost of intro-
ducing new products to the market will not be covered by subsequent sales.
We elaborate on this argument in this paper.1
Within the general framework of the product life cycle, we propose a thres-
hold model that includes the fixed costs of introduction as a major con-
cern when deciding whether or not to introduce new products to the market
(see among others Felder et al. (1996), Mairesse and Mohnen (2001)). This
study analyses an indicator of a firm’s innovative output, i.e. sales per
employee of products that are ‘new to the firm’ as a response to competition,
and the firm-specific cost structure. This indicator was first analysed in Brou-
wer and Kleinknecht (1996), who noted that, during the observation year,
many firms had no sales of new products and proposed an ad hoc model to
deal with those firms that had zero sales. One drawback to their procedure is
that the estimates of the parameters have no clear interpretation.
In this study we assume that a firm must incur fixed costs in order to intro-
duce a product innovation. When considering introducing a new product, the
firm will compare fixed costs with expected (net) revenues over the economic
lifetime of the product, and only if revenues exceed fixed costs, will the firm
introduce the product. We show that this simple theoretical model will lead to
a specific censored regression model, the stochastic threshold model. Moreover,
it can be argued on theoretical grounds that variables that affect fixed costs do
not have a direct effect on the level of sales. This suffices to identify the para-
meters of the threshold model. Although without making further assumptions,
we cannot directly estimate fixed costs, we can identify determinants of the
threshold and of the sales of innovative products. This is an improvement on
the estimates obtained by Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996), who did not make
a distinction between the two equations. Their estimates are reduced-form esti-
mates, whereas we present estimates that correspond to a structural model, and
we allow an economic interpretation in the context of that model. Our research
1 In this study we leave aside the issue of the timing of investments. Fennema et al. (2006)
found evidence of a two-year cycle of investment spikes. In this paper we concentrate on the
decision whether or not to introduce new products onto the market.
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is also useful in connection with the protracted discussions in the Netherlands
in recent years about how to promote innovations.
This paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we discuss the main deter-
minants of the threshold and the fixed costs equation, we introduce the theo-
retical model and describe the corresponding econometric model. Section 3
discusses our data. Section 4 presents our hypotheses. In Section 5 we present
and discuss the outcomes of our estimates, and conclusions are drawn in sec-
tion 6.
2 SALES OF INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS WITH FIXED INTRODUCTION COSTS
2.1 Introduction
Generally speaking, the market for new products, just like any other mar-
ket, is determined predominantly by demand, supply and market conditions,
in addition to other determinants such as institutional factors or long-term
technological developments, which are beyond the scope of this paper. We are
assuming that, in principle, individual firms are capable of adapting to chan-
ges in market conditions only by changing their own products, i.e. the firm-
specific supply characteristics, and we assume demand factors as given. We
will elaborate on the supply-side factors below.
Only very large firms are capable of moulding market conditions to their
own interests, whereas the majority of smaller firms are forced to accept the
market conditions as given. The situation is even more complicated when inno-
vative products are introduced to the market. At company level, firms compete
along product characteristic lines, price, quality and other factors specific to
that particular firm or product. The joint outcome in competing on a more
aggregate level implies technological development or technological opportuni-
ties and demand articulation, which can be understood by applying the theo-
retical ideas of the product life cycle model.2 This model states that the higher
the pace of technological development, the more firms must invest in the deve-
lopment of new products, as old products are superseded by superior new ones
2 The model of the product life cycle brings together the combined effects of technological
opportunities, dominant design, demand, entry and exit, the distribution of size of firms, and
market conditions in time and builds on the work of Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and
Graddy (1990). See among others Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and Klepper and Simons
(2000), Klepper (2002) for an empirical assessment. The notion of dominant design stems from
Albernathy and Utterback (1978), Rosenberg (1982) and Sahal (1986). For a review of the notion
of dominant design in economics see Nelson (1995). A different strand of literature points at the
relationship between business cycles and innovation using the ‘demand pull’ and ‘supply push’
paradigm, and the associated controversy (see Schmookler (1996), Scherer (1982)). However, the
causal effects of demand pull or supply push on innovative activities are not substantiated by
empirical findings (Scherer (1982); Geroski and Walters (1995)).
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(from competing firms). In branches characterized by mature technology and
modest opportunities for further technological development, firms are more
likely to improve products on an incremental basis, and their earnings will
stem predominantly from improved or unaltered products, though probably
produced more cheaply as a result of cost-reducing process innovation.
There is also a direct relationship between the sales of innovative products
and market structure and, implicitly, the average size of firms in a specific
branch. According to the product life cycle, there are many small firms that
compete in the first stages of technological development on design, and on
combinations of product and market. In this situation the market structure
manifests a low seller concentration. Later, when a specific combination of
product and market dominates technological development, and when consu-
mers are more inclined towards a particular design, firms have to abandon
their unsuccessful product – market combinations in favour of a more suc-
cessful competing design. Once a dominant design has been established, firms
will start to compete on price and economies of scale become an import-
ant determinant in order to survive, which starts the ‘oligopolistic shake-out’.
Many firms that fail to achieve a minimum efficient production scale must
sooner or later leave the market, which results in a market dominated by a
few large firms competing on price (Klepper (1996)). However, firms facing
Bertrand competition have a strong incentive to increase their profit margin
through product differentiation, and will therefore reap more sales from new
products if their products succeed in time (Martin (1993); Kaniovski (2005)).
On a micro level, small firms have a strong incentive to introduce new pro-
ducts into the market in order to create a niche market, in which they have to
change in order to survive competition with current firms. On the other hand,
large firms have an incentive to invest in both process (economies of scale)
and product innovation (economies of scope) in order to maintain their mar-
ket position (Cohen and Klepper (1996)). Based on this strand of literature,
one could expect a (stylized) U-shaped relationship between the sales of new
products and the seller concentration. This U-shape is also congruent with
the Schumpeter Mark I and II relationships between the size of the firm and
the incentive to innovate (Baumol (2002); Kamien and Schwartz (1975, 1982);
Scherer (1982, 1992)).
The relationship between competition and innovation recently became
more puzzling. Aghion et al. (2005) have shown that an inverted U-shaped
relationship between competition and innovation fits much better in UK
panel data covering the period between 1973 and 1994, which challenges
both empirical and theoretical findings of the traditional Industrial Orga-
nization (IO) literature. In their paper they present an alternative model,
which boils down to different strategic, step-by-step product innovative beha-
viour in so-called levelled industries and neck and neck industries. The
‘escape competition effect’ increases the incremental profit from innovation,
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but the ‘Schumpeterian effect’ reduces innovation incentives for laggards as
competition increases. “The balance between these two effects changes bet-
ween low and high levels of competition, generating an inverted U-shaped
relationship” (Aghion et al. (2005, pp. 720–721)).
What are the factors that affect the costs of introducing new innovative
products into the market? Firms can implement several strategies to minimize
the fixed costs of introduction. In this respect the role of knowledge spillovers
is very important. Innovation is all about developing (technical) knowledge.
In a seminal paper, Jaffe (1986, pp. 984) states: ‘Since knowledge is inher-
ently a public good, the existence of technologically related research efforts
of other firms may allow a given firm to achieve results with less research
effort than otherwise’. Therefore, firms that are actively seeking opportunities
to exploit knowledge spillovers will have a competitive advantage, assuming
those firms have enough absorptive capacity to make effective use of those
knowledge spillovers.
Besides knowledge spillovers originating from (semi) public sources, sup-
pliers and customers also serve as important sources of knowledge. According
to Von Hippel (1988), it is not necessarily the inventor who develops the inno-
vation. Instead, it is the actor in the vertical chain of product development
(distributed innovation process) that has the best opportunity to manage the
appropriability conditions who will be the innovator. We expect that firms that
rely on information from suppliers and customers as sources of innovation have
a better opportunity to appropriate the rents of innovation and to spend less
on introducing new products (see among others Lilien et al. (2002)).
This paper examines a theoretical and empirical model based on Brou-
wer (1997). The theoretical model implies that the innovative product will be
introduced if the (expected) sales exceed a certain threshold. We then specify
an empirical model that corresponds to this theoretical model, and we show
that the restrictions derived from the theoretical model are sufficient to iden-
tify the threshold, which we assume to be firm specific.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
In addition to the fixed costs of introduction, theremaybe other reasons for a firm
with R&D activities not having sales of innovative products in a particular year.
The product may still be under development, or the firm may only have achieved
process innovations. The latter were enquired about in a question requiring a ‘yes’
or ‘no’ response, without any sales related to it being assessed. We concentrate in
our analysis on firms that engage permanently in R&D, as opposed to occasio-
nally, and that havedevelopednewproducts in the recent past. Broader definitions
of sample firms have also been tentatively used in our estimates but will not be
documented in detail, since these analyses did not lead to substantially different
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outcomes. We assume that our firms with R&D activities can decide whether to
introduce an innovative product in any year.
First we introduce the variables used in the model.
s =R&D spending;
y =Annual sales of the innovative product;
µ=Expected annual sales of the innovative product;
c =Fixed cost of introducing the innovative product;
T =Economic lifespan of the innovative product;
r =Discount rate;
γ =Mark-up of the price over variable cost per unit.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all R&D spending is made at
time 0, just before the decision to introduce the product. At that time the
expected discounted return from the investment s is
T∫
0
γ ·µ(s) · e−r t ·dt − s − c (1a)
In practice µ can, of course, vary over time. We assume µ is constant
over the economic lifespan. This approximation regarding µ is not restrictive,
because in the theoretical model we will only deal with the total discounted
sales of the innovative product over the economic lifespan. The integral of
expression (1a) can be worked out:
γ
r
·
(
1− e−rT
)
·µ(s)− s − c (1b)
We assume that R&D spending s has a positive effect on the expected sales
of the innovative product. Given s > 0, the first-order condition for a profit
maximum is
γ
r
·
(
1− e−rT
)
·µ′ (s)=1 (2)
If we assume that µ′′ (s) < 0 and µ′ (s) > 0, then the first-order equation
has a finite solution. However, if there is no value of s satisfying equation (2),
then expression (1a) and (1b) decrease for every s >0, and the optimal R&D
investment will be equal to zero. We denote the optimal R&D investment by
sopt. The optimal level of R&D spending is independent of the fixed costs of
introduction c. Furthermore, R&D spending rises with γ , which is an index
of competition. The stronger the competition, the lower the optimal R&D
spending. Unfortunately, we do not have an index of competition, or infor-
mation about the mark-up. Instead, we use a Herfindahlindex as a proxy of
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competition.3 The optimal level also rises with T , and falls with r . In addi-
tion, we have no indicator of the economic lifespan of the innovative product
at our disposal. This may seem an important omission in order to identify
the proposed model. However, from an entrepreneurial point of view, future
sales are unknown and the decision to introduce a new product into the mar-
ket will depend on expected sales, which will depend on demand i.e. consumer
preferences, product substitution and imitation, in short competition, which is
already incorporated in the model. We will elaborate on supply, demand and
market conditions below.
Note that µ(s) is the expected sales at the time that the level of R&D spen-
ding is determined. In this model these expenditures on R&D are referred to
as the current R&D spending, which is the costs the entrepreneur is expected
to recover from sales in order to distinguish from the R&D spending in the
past that can be considered a sunk cost, which, by definition, has no relevance
in the decision-making process as to whether or not new products should be
introduced into the market. When deciding whether or not to introduce the
innovative product, the expected sales differ from their previously expected
value by a prediction error ν and are equal to
y =µ (sopt)+ν (3)
The innovation is introduced if, and only if, the expected discounted return
exceeds the fixed cost of introduction
γ · (µ (sopt)+ν) · (1− e−r ·T )
r
> c (4)
Equation (3) and inequality (4) specify a threshold regression model: if the
expected revenues exceed the threshold costs (in inequality (4)) then sales are
given in equation (3).
This simple theoretical model implies that the optimal level of R&D spen-
ding and hence the expected sales of the new product, are independent of the
cost of introduction. This does not mean that the R&D effort is independent
of the costs of introduction. If the expected costs of introduction are high, the
project may be unprofitable, i.e. the expected discounted return in (1) may be
negative, and the project will not be implemented. However, given the fact that
a project is profitable, the optimal spending is independent of the fixed costs
of introduction. This result is important for the specification of the threshold
model, because it justifies the exclusion of variables that affect the fixed cost of
introduction from the sales equation. It should be stressed that R&D effort in
3 Strictly speaking a Herfindahlindex of concentration is not an equivalent of an index of
competition. However, in line with the Structure-Conduct-Performance framework a concen-
tration index can be regarded as a proxy of competition (Church and Ware (2000)). Creusen
et al. (2006) present a recent discussion on the measurement of competition.
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our empirical model is an explanatory variable and not a dependent variable,
i.e. we model the sales of innovative products given (past) R&D effort.
2.3 The Econometric Model
For the specification of the econometric model that corresponds to equations
(3) and (4), it is convenient to introduce some further notation:
y =Observed annual sales of innovative products; (in the estimations we
take the log in order to avoid heteroskedasticity);
y∗ =Latent annual sales of innovative products;
c∗ =Latent fixed threshold;
x =Exogenous variables that influence the sales of innovative products;
z =Exogenous variables that influence the threshold of sales of innovative
products;
β =Vector of regression coefficients of variables x ;
α =Vector of regression coefficients of variables z;
ε =Error term of sales equation;
η=Error term of threshold equation;
σε =Standard deviation of ε;
ση =Standard deviation of η;
ρ =Correlation coefficient of ε and η.
We do not attempt to estimate the structural model in (3) and (4) directly.
From (4) we see that the threshold is
c∗ = c · r
γ · (1− e−r ·T ) <
(
µ
(
sopt
)+ν) (5)
We express c∗in (5) and µ
(
sopt
)
in (3) as a function of exogenous variables
z and x , respectively. In the sequel, we use the exclusion restrictions of the
economic model. In other words, variables that affect the threshold through
the fixed cost c do not enter the sales equation (3). Hence, we obtain the
latent regression equations
c∗ = zα +η (6)
y∗ = xβ + ε (7)
(
ε
η
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ 2ε ..
ρσεση σ
2
η
))
(8)
Firms will have sales of new products if, and only if, the (expected) sales
of the new product exceed the threshold c∗. Hence, the latent and observed
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variables are related by
I = I (y∗ > c∗) (9)
y =
[
0 if I =0
y∗ if I =1
]
(10)
The probability of positive sales of a new product is
Pr(I =1)=Pr (y∗ > c∗)=Φ
(
xβ − zα
ση∗
)
(11)
where σ 2η∗ =σ 2η +σ 2ε −2ρσεση is the variance of η∗ =η−ε, and φ is the cumu-
lative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The expected
sales of the innovative product, conditional on the event that they are posi-
tive, are
E(y|I =1)= xβ + σ
2
ε
σ 2η∗
ϕ
(
xβ−zα
ση∗
)
Φ
(
xβ−zα
ση∗
) (12)
where φ is the density function of the standard normal distribution (see John-
son and Kotz (1980)).
The likelihood function of the threshold model is derived from the joint
distribution of the observed variables (y, I )
fy,I (I =0)=Pr
(
y∗ < c∗
)=1−Φ
(
xβ − zα
ση∗
)
(13)
fy,I (y, I =1)=Pr
(
c∗ < y∗
∣∣y∗ = y ) · fy∗(y)
=Φ
⎛
⎝ (y − zα)−ρ ·ση
(
y−xβ
σε
)
ση
√
1−ρ2
⎞
⎠ · ϕ
(
y−xβ
σε
)
σε
(14)
The loglikelihood can be used to estimate the unknown model parameters.
It is also possible to estimate the model by a two-stage estimation method
(see Maddala (1983, pp. 228–230)). We used the estimates of the two-stage
method as starting values for the maximum likelihood estimation.
Nelson (1977, p. 315) and Maddala (1983, p. 229) discussed the identifica-
tion of the parameters of the threshold model. A sufficient condition for iden-
tification is that the sales equation contains at least one exogenous variable
that is not in the threshold equation. As noted before, variables that affect
the threshold through the cost of introduction can be excluded from the sales
equation, so that this condition can be easily satisfied.
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3 THE DATA
3.1 Source and Background
We used data from the Dutch section of the Community Innovation Survey
(CIS) for 1994–1996 (CIS2) and 1996–1998 (CIS21/2, see CBS (1998, 2000)).
The CIS data comprise firms in all sectors with 10 or more employees. We
merged the two datasets in order to have information over a longer period of
time, and in order to be able to construct lagged exogenous variables, which
will be discussed later.4 Both questionnaires consisted of two parts. Firms
were asked in the first part to give basic details about the firm, such as the
branch of principal activity, sales, exports, employment, etc. The second part
included questions on R&D, innovation and related issues. Only firms that
answered at least one of the following three questions in the affirmative were
asked to complete the second part of the questionnaire:
• Did your firm develop any technologically changed products during
1996–1998?
• Did your firm develop any technologically changed processes during
1996–1998?
• Does your firm plan to develop any technologically changed products or
processes in the years 1999–2001?
Firms that gave a positive answer to any of these questions in both que-
stionnaires are defined as innovative.
A distinction is made in the survey between three types of product: (1)
essentially unchanged products; (2) incrementally improved products, and (3)
radically changed or totally new products. In this paper we refer to the last
category as ‘innovative products’ and this is the subject of our analysis. A fur-
ther distinction is made in the survey between:
• Products ‘new to the firm’;
• Products ‘new to the market’.
Although it is tempting to use products ‘new to the market’ as an indica-
tor of the most innovative products, here we use products ‘new to the firm’
as the endogenous variable, because the ‘new to the market’ indicator suffers
from a serious problem in the way firms interpret their scope of the relevant
market. For instance, are firms referring to the Dutch market, the European
or the world market? Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996) refer to the relation-
ship between the export share of firms and the turnover from products ‘new
to the market’, the higher the export share, the less turnover from products
‘new to the market’ they have. Therefore, it seems that firms, more oriented
4 We also included lagged exogenous variables to address potential endogeneity issues.
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toward the home market which, in the case of the Dutch market, tends to
be relatively small, are overestimating their innovative efforts. We restrict our
analysis to sales ‘new to the firm’ in order to avoid this ambiguity.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The aim of our model is to capture innovation in manufacturing industries.
We excluded firms in the service sector from the merged dataset. Firms
were then selected according to the following criteria: presented in both que-
stionnaires (CIS2 and CIS21/2), being innovative in 1994–1998, and with an
R&D output at least in 1996–1998. Finally, this selection resulted in a data-
base of 2279 firms. A brief comparison of firms selected and those excluded
from the sample show that small firms are under represented in the sample,
and the selected firms have, on average, a higher export share (see the Appen-
dix). We can distinguish two groups of firms within the sample of 2279 firms.
The first group comprises 1002 innovative firms with turnover from innovative
products in 1996–1998 as defined earlier. The second group consists of inno-
vative firms without turnover from innovative products in 1996–1998. The lat-
ter group comprises of 1277 firms focusing on process innovations, or firms in
the stage of developing new products that have not yet been introduced to the
market.
The descriptive statistics for all the innovative firms are given in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the average turnover is 31million Dutch Guilders or
16million US Dollars.5 The difference in turnover between firms with and
without turnover from innovative products is small and insignificant. Moreo-
ver, the number of employees does not differ significantly between the two
groups of firms. The average size is about a 100 employees. The standard
deviations of total turnover and the number of employees are quite large,
because about 90% of all Dutch firms have 50 employees or less, but there
are also a few large (multinational) companies in the sample that have high
labour productivity and high sales of new products. This therefore reflects the
very skewed distribution of the size of firms in the Netherlands. Because of
this, and on theoretical grounds, on which we elaborate later, we will model
size in a non-linear fashion. Innovative firms obtain, on average, about 13%
of their turnover from the sale of innovative products, and 8.3% if weighted
with the size of firms, meaning that larger firms have less turnover from new
products.
The descriptive statistics of the variables for dataset 1 (all innovative
firms), 2 (firms with turnover from new products) and 3 (firms without new
5 The Dutch guilder was replaced in 2000 by the euro. All the statistics before 2000 are in
Dutch currency. In the year 1998 the average exchange rate was 1.9825 guilder for one US
dollar (source Dutch National Bank, DNB).
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TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL
(1) All
innovative
firms
(2) Firms
with
turnover
new
products
(3) Firms
without
turnover
new
products
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Sig*
Dummy: 1= turnover form pro-
ducts new to the firm 1998
0.440 0.496 1 0
Log turnover 1998 17.269 1.464 17.241 1.491 17.292 1.443
Log turnover from products new
to the firm 1998
6.487 7.423 14.754 1.818 n/a n/a
Turnover from products new to
the firm as % of total turnover
1998
0.059 0.116 0.133 0.144 n/a n/a
Log number of employees (FTE)
1998
4.580 1.094 4.604 1.134 4.562 1.062
R&D employment intensity 1996 0.024 0.056 0.041 0.067 0.014 0.047 ***
% of total R&D spending which
have to be recovered 1996
0.385 0.392 0.394 0.366 0.378 0.411 ***
Source of information: internal
(score 0..1) 1996
0.396 0.310 0.536 0.241 0.338 0.317 ***
Source of information: suppliers
or customers (score 0..1) 1996
0.324 0.284 0.449 0.241 0.268 0.283 ***
Source of information: publicly
available information, proxy for
knowledge spillovers (score 0..1)
1996
0.193 0.190 0.279 0.180 0.152 0.177 ***
Dummy: 1=firms established in
1994—1996
0.022 0.148 0.024 0.153 0.021 0.144
Dummy: 1=firms engaged in
R&D cooperation 1996
0.270 0.444 0.392 0.489 0.211 0.408 ***
Dummy: 1=firms received sub-
sidies to stimulate technological
progress 1998
0.428 0.495 0.626 0.484 0.273 0.445 ***
Observations 2279 1002 1277
Difference between means of firms in dataset 2 and dataset 3: ***Significant at the 1% level,
**Significant at the 5% level and *Significant at the 10% level.
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products) differ significantly, except for the following variables: turnover, the
number of employees and the fraction of firms established in 1994–1996.
4 SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Before presenting the results, we formulate the hypotheses to be tested with
our model. This allows us to identify variables that can be included or exclu-
ded from either the fixed cost equation or sales equation. We first deal with
hypotheses regarding the sales equation, then we deal with the fixed cost
equation.
4.1 Determinants of Sales of New Products
H1: R&D intensity and sales of new products
Since R&D expenditures are a major input in the innovation process, we
expect a firm’s R&D intensity to be directly related to its ‘output’ of product
innovations. R&D intensity is a proxy for firm-specific adaptation to market
conditions and branch-specific technological change.
H2: Competition/Market structure and sales of new products
We argued in section 2 that the link between competition/market structure
and innovation is a complicated one. Based on the product life cycle model
and mainstream IO literature, we might expect a (stylized) U-shaped relation-
ship between the sales of new products and the seller concentration, expres-
sed as the Herfindahl-equivalent index.6 According to Aghion et al. (2005) we
might expect an inverted U-shape relationship. In order to investigate the rela-
tionship between the sales of new products and the seller concentration, we
include a Herfindahl-equivalent index and Herfindahl-equivalent index squa-
red to capture the non-linear relationship. The coefficients will indicate which
type of reasoning is appropriate.
4.1.1 Other Factors
The sample includes mature firms and newly established firms. We first have
to correct for start-up firms because, by necessity, new or start-up firms only
have sales of new products and no sales of improved or unaltered products.
We therefore include a dummy in the sales equation, whether a firm is a start-
up-firm i.e. a firm established in the 1994–1996 period or not, in order to rec-
tify this potential bias. We expect this dummy to have a positive effect on the
level of sales.
6 The Herfindahl-equivalent is equal to the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index (1/H). The
Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared market shares of firms in a particular sector.
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4.2 Determinants of the Fixed Cost Equation
H3: Product related R&D investments and the fixed cost equation
We expect that the more a firm has to spend on developing product-related
R&D activities, the higher the costs of introduction will be, which means that
these costs have to be recouped. Awaiting the introduction of a new product
into the market, we assume that firms will shift their total R&D expenditu-
res towards more product-related R&D expenditures, such as expenditures on
the development of production facilities or specialized equipment, design and
marketing and, apart from expenditures on fundamental or basic research
according to the chain-linked model of innovation of Kline and Rosenberg
(1986). The percentage of total R&D investment spent on the introduction
of new products serves as a proxy of costs directly related to the fixed cost
of introducing new products. These costs differ from R&D expenditures in
the pre-competitive phase of developing products, which can be considered
as sunk costs. Sunk costs are, by definition, irrelevant in the decision-making
process as to whether or not to introduce new products into the market.
H4: R&D co-operation and R&D subsidies lower the fixed costs of sales of new
products
The sharing of knowledge and risks through R&D co-operation agree-
ments decreases the fixed cost of introduction of new products, besides
enhancing future innovatory benefits by internalizing positive external effects
(De Bondt (1996)). R&D subsidies directly lower the fixed costs.
H5: Knowledge spillovers and the fixed cost equation
We expect that using external sources of knowledge, such as information
from consultants, universities, patent-data, and other semi-public agencies,
will lower the costs of R&D or, more particularly, the fixed costs of introdu-
cing new products into the market. Furthermore, we expect that sources of
information originating from suppliers and customers will have a downward
effect on the fixed costs of introduction, compared with costs for firms that
predominantly rely on internal knowledge.7
7 From the point of view of individual firms, a firm tends to focus on receiving knowledge
spillovers and at the same time tries to avoid sending spillovers and thus creating positive
appropriability conditions (Teece (1986)). CIS2 does not comprise direct information to distin-
guish between incoming (receiving) and outgoing (sending) knowledge spillovers, especially the
measurement of outgoing knowledge spillovers is cumbersome (see Cassiman and Veugelers
(2002), in an attempt to use proxies to distinguish between incoming and outgoing knowledge
spillovers).
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4.3 Other Exogenous Variables
H6: Size of firms and innovative products
One important exogenous variable is the size of the firms, operationalized
as the log of the number of employees. We expect the size of the firm to affect
both the level of sales and the amount of investment required to introduce
new products into the market. The larger the firm, the more resources are
available to invest in introducing new products and, at the same time, larger
firms are expected to have better market opportunities to realize sales of new
products (economies of scope). This combined effect resembles the theory of
‘spreading’ introduced by Cohen and Klepper (1996) in order to explain why
larger firms invest relatively more in R&D, albeit with a lower efficiency com-
pared with smaller firms. However, the situation is somewhat more complica-
ted. On average, larger firms will have a larger product portfolio and, in order
to prevent ‘cannibalizing’ their existing product portfolio, larger firms will be
more reluctant to introduce new products into the market (Conner (1988)).
We expect that size will have a non-linear effect on both the level of sales and
on the fixed cost. Furthermore, we have included branch dummies in the cost
equation in order to correct technology and/or branch specific costs of intro-
duction.
One might argue that prior to introducing new products into the market,
firms have to deal with all kinds of competitive effects between (competing)
firms in the same market, and that those factors will influence the decision-
making process. Unfortunately, we do not have any information about compe-
ting firms or competing products. CIS data only register the outcome of the
decision-making process, whether firms have turnover from new products or
not. We assume that firm-specific market conditions are incorporated in the
decision-making process and are reflected in the fixed cost and will not induce
biased estimates.
5 RESULTS
The estimates of the threshold model are summarized in Table 2 for products
new to the firm. The threshold is not observed directly, but can be derived
from the model by subtracting the costs of introduction from the sales. A
positive coefficient in the costs equation means that the corresponding varia-
ble is positively related to the sales threshold. In other words, it increases the
threshold. If the coefficient of a variable that is found in the costs equation
and in the sales equation is positive, and if it is larger in the sales equation
than in the threshold equation, then the variable increases the probability that
the firm will innovate (see equation 11). The same is true if the coefficient in
the sales equation is negative and smaller than in the threshold equation.
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TABLE 2 – THE ESTIMATION RESULTS
Exogenous variables Sales equation Fixed costs equation
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 11.004 185.020∗∗∗ 10.699 170.853∗∗∗
Dummy: 1=firms established in
1994–1996
0.337 5.524∗∗∗
R&D employment intensity 1996 1.670 25.652∗∗∗
Log turnover 1998 0.813 28.214∗∗∗ 1.468 28.214∗∗∗
Log turnover 1998, squared (coeffi-
cient multiplied by 10)
0.303 7.513∗∗∗ −0.231 7.513∗∗∗
Herfindahl equivalent index −0.195 −6.611∗∗∗
Herfindahl equivalent index squared
(coefficient multiplied by 100)
0.237 7.414∗∗∗
% of total R&D spending which have
to be recovered 1996
0.134 2.360∗∗
Dummy: 1=firms engaged in
co-operation 1996
−0.036 −0.649
Dummy: 1=firms received subsidies
to stimulate technological progress
1998
−1.017 −17.997∗∗∗
Source of information: internal (score
0..1) 1996
−0.466 −7.621∗∗∗
Source of information: suppliers or
customers (score 0..1) 1996
−0.475 −7.740∗∗∗
Source of information: publicly availa-
ble information, proxy for knowledge
spillovers (score 0..1) 1996
−1.117 −17.444∗∗∗
Dummy: 1=Pavitt taxonomy, Scale-
intensive industrial firms#
−1.244 −21.515∗∗∗
Dummy: 1=Pavitt taxonomy, Specia-
lized equipment suppliers#
−1.139 −18.844∗∗∗
No. obs. 2279
Log likelihood −2892.82
Log likelihood base-line model −3583.59
LR test 1381.54
Mc Fadden R2 0.19
Zimmerman-Veal R2 0.50
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level and
*Significant at the 10% level. #Adopted from Pavitt (1984).
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Even though the threshold is not being observed, the parameters of the
threshold equation and those of the sales equation are identified by exclu-
sion restrictions. The theoretical model in section 2.2 implies that variables
that affect the fixed costs can be excluded from the sales equation. For that
reason, a variable such as R&D collaboration or product introductory related
R&D expenditures does not enter the sales equation. We do allow for corre-
lation between the error terms in the threshold and sales equations. This cor-
relation captures common firm-specific variables that have been omitted from
both equations.
We now go on to discuss the parameter estimates in Table 2, starting with
the effect of size on both the fixed costs and sales, then the parameter esti-
mates of the sales equation and, lastly, the parameter estimates of the fixed
costs equation.
Size
As we expected, larger firms realize higher sales of new products.
Larger firms benefit from economies of scale and scope and therefore have
the production and marketing capacity to achieve higher sales of new pro-
ducts. Smaller firms are forced to focus on niche markets, which are smaller
by definition, and therefore the potential to realize sales of new products is
also smaller.
5.1 Parameter Estimates of the Sales Equation
Table 2 shows that new firms have indeed a significantly higher percentage of
sales of new products, which confirms that the inclusion of newly-established
firms could introduce a bias in the estimations.
A higher R&D intensity results in higher sales of new products. This is
consistent with the theoretical model in section 2 and hypothesis 1 above.
The effect of market structure measured by a Herfindahl-equivalent index
on the sale of new products, departs from hypothesis 2. Instead of a U-shape,
we find a non-linear negative relationship (convex) between the seller concen-
tration and sales of new products, meaning that markets with a lower seller
concentration i.e. dominated by relatively small firms, generate more turno-
ver from new products. Our empirical result is congruous with most empiri-
cal work on the relationship between competition and innovation (see Nickell
(1996)), and this finding agrees with the Schumpeter Mark I theory (Schum-
peter (1934)) and Arrow’s replacement effect, which restrain large companies
from investing seriously in product innovations (Arrow (1962)). However, this
result does not fully comply with the proposed Schumpeterian and product
life cycle models, as discussed in section 2, which predict a U-shaped relati-
onship between innovative activities and market structure.
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5.2 Parameter Estimates of the Fixed Costs Equation
5.2.1 Product Related R&D Investments
Hypothesis 3 states that there is a positive relationship between product rela-
ted R&D expenditures as a percentage of total R&D investments and the
fixed costs, which have to be recouped from the sales of new products. The
parameter estimate confirms this hypothesis showing a positive and significant
coefficient. We also stated that, according to economic theory, sunk costs do
not have any significance in deciding on investments such as R&D expendi-
tures at the introduction of new products into the market.
5.2.2 R&D Collaboration and R&D Subsidies
In accordance with hypothesis 4, R&D collaboration and subsidies reduce the
fixed costs of introduction, although the effect of R&D collaboration is insi-
gnificant. A major R&D policy instrument in the Netherlands is a general
tax-credit facility to lower the labour costs of R&D personnel, entitled the
WBSO.8 The purpose of the WBSO is to reduce the R&D costs of firms, in
particular those of SMEs. Large firms are bound to a maximum of tax cre-
dits. Subsidies, including the WBSO, reduce the costs of introducing new pro-
ducts into the market. One could argue that the effect of the WBSO is not
entirely exogenous. Firms anticipating the introduction of new products may
have an incentive to apply.
One possible explanation for not finding a significant effect of collabora-
tion on the fixed costs might be that, besides a cost-reducing motive to be
engaged in R&D collaboration, there could also be a skill-sharing motive,
such as to develop and share new knowledge, different fields of technology
or different markets (Sakakibara (1997)). The collaborative efforts could be
focused on applied knowledge for specific products competing on the market
(non-collusive R&D cooperation) or geared towards more basic knowledge in
order to strengthen the innovative skills of the collaborators on a basic level
and in an early phase of the innovation cycle. In the latter case, the effect
of R&D co-operation will not have a significant effect on the fixed costs. We
do not have any additional information to disentangle the two effects, but the
estimates seem to indicate that the skill-sharing type of R&D collaboration is
predominant and thus mitigates the cost reducing effect of R&D-cooperation
on fixed costs.
5.2.3 Knowledge Spillovers
Table 2 shows that the intensive use of numerous different sources of infor-
mation significantly decreases the fixed costs. The estimated coefficients show
8 WBSO is an acronym of the Dutch name of the act to encourage R&D (Wet Bevordering
Speur-en Ontwikkelingswerk).
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that knowledge spillovers have the strongest effect, and the use of internal
knowledge the weakest effect. In line with Jaffe (1986), this result shows that
innovating firms benefit most from overall knowledge spillovers. The question
is how these findings should be interpreted. Jaffe (1986) argues that know-
ledge spillovers reflect the technological opportunities that exist in a particular
branch. Technological opportunities are an incentive for product development
and a signal that product differentiation is a profitable strategy. If a particu-
lar branch has few technological opportunities, the amount of research nee-
ded to come up with something new will be higher compared with a branch
with an abundance of technological opportunities. According to Jaffe’s rea-
soning, it is not primarily the knowledge itself but rather its signalling effect
that is important. This would explain why the other sources of knowledge are
also important, besides general knowledge spillovers. The estimates of coeffi-
cients of sources of internal information and information regarding suppliers
or customers show that relying on one’s own technological strength or being
involved in a distributed product development, as exposed by Von Hippel
(1988), appear to be equally effective.
We performed a number of simulations to improve our understanding of
the implications of the estimates. For that purpose we define a reference firm
that resembles the average firm in our sample. In the simulations we change
one exogenous variable at a time and consider its effect on the sales threshold,
the sales per employee of innovative products, and the probability of an inno-
vative product being introduced. The reported importance of a continuous
independent variable is calculated as the difference between the effect corre-
sponding to the basic value of this variable plus the standard deviation, and
the effect corresponding to the basic value of this variable minus the standard
deviation. The effect of an independent dummy variable is obtained by the
difference between the situation in which the dummy variable is equal to 1
and the situation in which the dummy variable is equal to 0.
Subsidies are one of the most important factors to decrease the threshold. On
average, the granting of subsidies reduces the threshold by more than 2.7million
euros. The probability of introducing a new product will increase by 25%.
According to the estimated coefficients, the relationship between com-
petition and innovation is U-shaped, particularly when we looked at the
coefficients of number of employees and the Herfindahl-equivalent index. We
concluded that the smaller and larger firms are more likely to innovate. And
we could then say that Schumpeter (1934) was right, after all. The small firms
are the real innovators (Mark I) and if they are not innovative then the lar-
ger firms will be the innovators (Mark II). According to the simulation we
see a slightly different picture – the curve is not a complete U-shaped curve.
We see that the smaller firms are the most innovative firms, and the pro-
bability of being innovative diminishes with size. We also see that the slope
will diminish, but the curve will not increase. That means that there is more
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TABLE 3 – THE EFFECTS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE SALES OF
NEW PRODUCTS, THE THRESHOLD FOR NEW PRODUCTS AND THE PROBABILITY
OF A NEW PRODUCT BEING INTRODUCED
Exogenous variables Sales
(thousand
Euros)
Threshold
(thousand
Euros)
Probability
of intro-
duction
(%)
Dummy: 1=firms established in 1994–1996 100 0 1
R&D employment intensity 1996 230 0 3
Log number of employees 1998∗ 5,330 10,060 −9
Log number of employees 1998, squared
Herfindahl equivalent index∗ −740 0 −102
Herfindahl equivalent index squared
% of total R&D spending that has to be
recovered 1996
0 290 −3
Dummy: 1=firms engaged in co-operation
1996
0 −100 1
Dummy: 1=firms received subsidies to sti-
mulate technological progress 1998
0 −2,760 25
Source of information: internal (score 0..1)
1996
0 −810 7
Source of information: suppliers or custo-
mers (score 0..1) 1996
0 −760 7
Source of information: publicly available
information, proxy for knowledge spillovers
(score 0..1) 1996
0 −1,200 10
Dummy: 1=Pavitt taxonomy, Scale-intensive
industrial firms
0 −1,850 18
Dummy: 1=Pavitt taxonomy, Specialized
equipment suppliers
0 −1,160 11
∗Total effect of the non-linear function
empirical evidence for Mark I than for Mark II. With our model and the
indicators we use for innovation and competition, we do not see an inverse
U-curve like Aghion et al. (2005) found in the UK.
Internal information, suppliers or customers’ information and publicly
available information are very important for firms, but these sources are slightly
less important than information from competitors and information from uni-
versities and GTIs. The threshold will diminish by around 1million euros and
the probability of introducing a new product will increase by between 7% and
10%.
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Firms in the scale-intensive sector or specialized equipment suppliers, will
have a lower threshold and a higher probability of introducing a new product
than the other remaining sectors.
Finally, we would like to state that the fit of our threshold model is rather
good. The Zimmerman Veal R2 and the Mc Fadden R2 are 0.50 and 0.19,
respectively. The value of the logarithm of likelihood of the threshold model
and the corresponding baseline model are −2892 and −3583, respectively.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have put forward a model to analyse the sales of new pro-
ducts. This model accounts for the fact that, even among firms that have per-
manent R&D activities, a fraction of firms do not have sales of innovative
products over a two-year observation period. We analyse an indicator of a
firm’s innovative output ‘new to the firm’. The firm must incur fixed costs in
order to introduce a product innovation. When considering the introduction
of a new product, the firm will compare fixed costs with expected (net) reve-
nues over the economic lifetime of the product, and only if revenues exceed
fixed costs (threshold) will the firm introduce the product.
Our results show that firms face a threshold when deciding whether or not
to introduce new products into the market. The fixed costs of introduction are
an obstacle to the introduction of new products. Firms focus on means to lower
these costs. Factors that are important to decrease the fixed costs include know-
ledge spillovers and R&D related subsidies. It is not surprising that R&D related
subsidies decrease the fixed costs. More interesting, however, are the differences
between knowledge spillovers and sources of information and their effect on the
fixed costs. These differences reveal much about the know-how of management
strategies in innovating firms. In general, spillovers of public knowledge have a
profound effect on the fixed costs, but interestingly, knowledge spillovers origi-
nating from the firm itself (technology initiator) or from suppliers and customers
(technology follower) have an equally decreasing effect on the fixed costs, albeit
a lower one. The results show that both strategies of technology initiator and
technology follower appear to be equally effective, which endorses the view of a
distributed innovation process, as exposed by Von Hippel (1988).
Our results also substantiated the idea that R&D expenditures, such as
expenditures on developing production facilities or specialized equipment,
design and marketing, are an important element in the decision-making pro-
cess whether or not to introduce new products onto the market, according
to the chain-linked model of Kline and Rosenberg (1986). The level of sales
of new products depends on the R&D intensity and market structure, once
more substantiating the Schumpeter Mark I paradigm and the Arrow repla-
cement effect, meaning that small (high-tech) firms are more important to
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commercialize innovative products, partially substantiating the product life
cycle model of Cohen and Klepper (1996).
APPENDIX: DATA PREPARATION AND SELECTION
The presence of lagged exogenous variables in the model poses extra demands
on the dataset. We used two questionnaires to create a dataset with lagged
variables. The first one is the regular Dutch CIS questionnaire comparable
with the Eurostat version, which comprises data for the period 1994–1996. It
is the policy of Statistics Netherlands to repeat the CIS questionnaire after
2 years. This ‘in between’ questionnaire, covering the period 1996–1998, is
identical to the Eurostat version, although extended with some additional
questions, which are of no concern for the purpose of this paper.
The initial dataset was created by merging the Dutch CIS2 (1994–1996)
and CIS21/2 (1996–1998) questionnaires. Of the database of 10996 firms, three
groups of firms were excluded: firms in the service sector, firms without any
innovative activity according to the Frascati manual, and firms that were
found in only one period. After excluding these firms, a database remained
consisting of 2278 firms, which leaves us with information covering the years
1994–1998. We used the 2278 firms to analyse the innovation threshold, of
which 1001 firms with sales from new products and 1277 firms without sales,
i.e. firms assumed not to be able to meet the threshold requirements.
The main question is whether the 2278 firms used in our analysis are repre-
sentative of all firms. In order to analyse this potential selection bias, we com-
pared the mean values of four firm indicators among the various selections
presented earlier. The indicators are: (1) the number of employees, and (2)
turnover in 1998, representing different aspects of the size of the firms invol-
ved. The other two indicators are: (3) the turnover per employee, represen-
ting a kind of ‘productivity’ measure, and (4) the export share, representing a
competition measure. Firms with a higher export share are expected to face
stronger competition because they are operating on a world market, while
firms with a lower export share are stepping up towards the domestic market.
Of course the four indicators are broad indicators, solely made up for the pur-
pose of identifying a possible selection bias, and not for a serious analysis of
firm characteristics. The characteristics of the four indicators and the results
of a t-test as to whether the means are statistically different from each other,
are presented in the table below.
TableA1 shows that the firms that were excluded from the main data-
base are, on average, significantly smaller, both in terms of the number of
employees and in terms of turnover. The turnover per employee does not
differ significantly, but the firms that were excluded have, on average, a
significantly lower export share. This selection bias can be explained by the
sampling procedure Statistics Netherlands applies. Due to the very skewed
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distribution of firm size, 82% of all firms in the Netherlands have 10–50
employees, a random selection of 18% of the firms with 10–50 employ-
ees received a CIS questionnaire, while all firms with 50 or more employees
received our questionnaire. In merging the two datasets (CIS2 and CIS21/2)
small firms are less likely to be selected in both CIS questionnaires (3% =
0.18 ∗ 0.18), and we selected only those firms that were included in both que-
stionnaires, resulting in a selection bias. In other words, merging two CIS que-
stionnaires and selecting firms included in both questionnaires will favour the
larger firms (i.e. 50 employees and more). This is reflected in the results of
TableA1, showing that the selected firms, included in both questionnaires are,
on average, larger.
Secondly, we investigated whether there are differences between firms with
or without sales of new products. TableA2 shows the results. Size is no longer
a discriminating factor in the population of selected firms. However, turnover
per employee and the export share differ significantly between the two sub-
TABLE A1 – CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR FIRM INDICATORS: NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES, TURNOVER, TURNOVER PER EMPLOYEE, AND EXPORT SHARE IN
1998 AFTER MERGING CIS2 AND CIS21/2
Whole data base
(CIS2 and CIS21/2
merged)
Number of
employees (fte)
1998
Turnover
1998 (×1000
guilders)
Turnover
(×1000
guilders) per
employee
(1998)
Export share
1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All firms
Mean 131.47 66138.55 521.216 11.3%
Std error mean 7.05 3473.37 31.973 0.002
Firms not selected
(8718 observations)
Mean 106.65 49263.96 518.463 8.6%
Std error mean 7.46 2656.46 39.378 0.002
Firms selected (2278
observations)
Mean 226.44 130734.40 531.752 21.5%
Std error mean 18.44 13249.91 33.320 0.007
t-test: selected versus
not selected firms
Diff −119.79 −81470.42 −13.289 −12.9%
Std err 19.89 13513.58 51.583 0.007
t-value −6.023 −6.029 −0.258 −17.938
Prob> |t | 0.0000 0.0000 0.7967 0.0000
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TABLE A2 – CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR FIRM INDICATORS: NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES, TURNOVER, TURNOVER PER EMPLOYEE, AND EXPORT SHARE IN
1998 RESTRICTED TO THE POPULATION OF FIRMS MEETING ALL SELECTION
CRITERIA
Selected firms Number of
employees (fte)
1998
Turnover
1998 (×1000
guilders)
Turnover
(×1000
guilders) per
employee
(1998)
Export share
1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firms without tur-
nover new products
(1277 observations)
Mean 227.44 119672.90 623.736 10.6%
Std error mean 29.870 17679.830 56.261 0.007
Firms with turnover
new products (1001
observations)
Mean 225.17 144831.80 414.405 35.3%
Std error mean 17.580 20013.620 23.993 0.011
t-test: firm with ver-
sus without turnover
new products
Diff 2.27 −25158.90 209.332 −24.7%
Std err 34.66 26704.33 61.164 0.013
t-value 0.066 −0.942 3.422 −18.810
Prob> |t | 0.9477 0.3462 0.0006 0.0000
populations, albeit in different directions. Firmswith turnover fromnewproducts
have, on average, a lower turnover per employee but a higher export share.
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